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A CALL TO CONTEXT: THE PROFESSIONAL
CHALLENGES OF CAUSE LAWYERING AT
THE INTERSECTION OF RACE, SPACE,
AND POVERTY
John 0. Calnzore*
If we are to fashion remedies for black poverty, we need to under-
stand the origins and dynamics of inequality in the African-Ameri-
can community. Without disavowing the accomplishments of the
civil rights movement, black leaders and policymakers now need to
give more attention to remedies that will make a concrete difference
in the lives of the poor.'
INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONAL legal analysis and advocacy are too often plagued
by the tendency to extrapolate issues from their history and the
broader social and normative contexts that bear so heavily on them.
Seldom will a client's legal problem be just a legal problem.2 By issu-
ing a call to context, I am directing attention to the inner-city poor's
lived experiences, including the interconnection of legal and non-legal
issues they confront, the web of experiences within which they live,
* Reef C. Ivey Research Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School
of Law at Chapel Hill. As an attorney with the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles,
the Western Center on Law and Poverty, and the National Housing Law Project from
1974-1985, and as a law professor since then, much of my advocacy work and scholar-
ship have focused on representing the inner-city poor. Thus, I refer to the legal advo-
cates herein in the first-person plural. My continuing involvement with issues of race
and poverty has been immeasurably enhanced through my working association withjohn powell, Director of the Institute on Race and Poverty, and through my serving
on the national advisory group for the institute. Finally, I thank Dean Judith Wegner
and the UNC School of Law for generous research support and Professor Bruce
Green for inviting me to participate in the conference on "The Delivery of Legal
Services to Low-Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues," Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law, Dec. 4-6, 1998. This Article addresses the conference's sub-theme,
"Rendering Legal Assistance to Similarly Situated Individuals."
1. William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban
Poor 195 (1996).
2. See John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Auththentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. Cal. L Rev.
2129, 2210-19 (1992) [hereinafter Calmore, Critical Race Theory] (discussing the util-
ity and strategic use of rights); John 0. Calmore, Erploring the Significance of Race
and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 Or. L Rev. 201,225-28 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Calmore, Exploring] (discussing the use of law to influence public policy and effec-
tuate rule change).
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and what Michael Katz calls "their anchor in context."3 This suggests
that we cannot view their issues or the features of context as fixed and
unchanging. Instead, we must view them as historically evolving, rela-
tional, changing in meaning, and, as Katz says, "to be interpreted in
terms of time and place."4
In considering why we describe law as a "profession," many focus
on the practice of law as a "public calling."5 From this perspective,
perhaps, the most profound issue in providing effective legal services
to the poor is whether legal advocacy on their behalf can maintain a
positive, operational connection between rights and justice. With or
without lawyers, for the inner-city poor, justice is hard to find. In the
quest for justice, representing the poor has generally attracted "cause
lawyers. '"6 Broadly speaking, cause lawyering encompasses various
law-related activities, from rights assertion to legal counseling, that
relies on law-related means to achieve social justice for individuals
and subordinated or disadvantaged groups.7 Whether representing in-
dividuals or groups, cause-oriented poverty lawyers often adopt an
orientation of antisubordination advocacy. This requires legal advo-
cates, especially attorneys, to cross traditional boundaries where "the
practice of law primarily consists of the hermeneutic reproduction of
that which already exists."8 This lawyering, moreover, must confront
the difficulties and contradictions that are part of working for social
change within and outside of the legal system's conventional
framework.9
3. Michael B. Katz, The Urban "Underclass" as a Metaphor of Social Transfor-
mation, in The "Underclass" Debate: Views from History 3, 23 (Michel B. Katz ed.,
1993).
4. Id.; see also Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in
Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 999, 1051-59 (1994) (discussing differ-
ent theories on the practice of poverty law).
5. Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69
Wash. L. Rev. 573, 573-74 (1994). Anthony Kronman observes that "it is a part of the
lawyer's job to be directly concerned with the public good-with the integrity of the
legal system ... with the health and well-being of the community the laws in part
establish and in part aspire to create." Anthony T. Kronman, Chapman University
School of Law Groundbreaking Ceremony, 1 Chapman L. Rev. 1, 3 (1998).
6. I adopt the theme of cause lawyering from Cause Lawyering: Political Com-
mitments and Professional Responsibilities (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
1998) [hereinafter Cause Lawyering].
7. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Un-
derstanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in Cause
Lawyering, supra note 6, at 31, 37.
8. Thomas C. Heller, Legal Discourse in the Positive State: A Post-Structualist
Account, in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State 173, 186 (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1986); see also Lois H. Johnson, The New Public Interest Law: From Old Theories to a
New Agenda, 1 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 169, 184 (1991) ("[A] new public interest lawyer
would not invoke abstract legal theories; rather, she would appeal to concrete needs
and community values.").
9. See Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Prac-
tice, 1 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 49, 49 (1991) (hereinafter Trubek, Critical Lawyering]. Ac-
cording to Trubek, some of the insights derived from "revisionist scholarship and
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In light of these considerations, this Article examines the political
commitments and professional responsibilities that I associate with
cause lawyering on behalf of the inner-city poor. These commitments
and responsibilities are particularly difficult, especially in attempting
to render effective legal representation to those who are similarly situ-
ated by virtue of the intersecting features of race, space, and poverty.
In this line of work, we must appreciate that poverty has multiple
dimensions. In terms of time, there is persistent poverty; in terms of
space, there is neighborhood poverty; and in terms of behavior, there
is underclass poverty.10 Sometimes, these dimensions coalesce and
those in poverty experience both stigmatizing and oppressive con-
straints. This predicament is worsened by societal imposition of nega-
tive racial characteristics as an overlay. In other words, poverty and
space become racialized to the detriment of these poor.1 This marks
the intersection of race, space, and poverty.
It is at this tripartite intersection that we find the client community
that is the subject of this Article. The intersection of race, space, and
poverty necessarily directs our attention to the significance of the
neighborhood aspects of poverty and its concentration effects.
Although the word "intersection" suggests a site where lines cross in a
way that intrudes or marks, I would not limit intersection to designat-
ing a static fixation. As I am using the term, intersection also con-
notes a dynamic process that extends beyond identity formation.
More than that, intersectionality additionally constitutes context:
framing the interconnection of issues and the web of experiences that
practice" on poverty law include "the importance of discourse, the need to under-
stand gender and race ... the critique of many of the laws... the reinvention of
arenas for practice, the need for community-based projects ... and the revision of our
understanding of the role of lawyers and the nature of professionalism." Louise G.
Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People: Revisionist Scholarship and Practice, 48 U.
Miami L. Rev. 983, 986 (1994) [hereinafter Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People].
10. See Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States,
1970-1980, in The Urban Underclass 235, 235-36 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peter-
son eds., 1991).
11. "Racialization" is a dialectical process of signification that reaches to the soci-
etal processes in which people participate and to the structures and institutions that
people produce. More specifically, racialization signifies the spread of racial mean-
ings to a relationship, social practice, or a group that was previously unclassified in
racial terms. See Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United
States: From the 1960s to the 1980s 64-66 (1986). Today, racialization is coded and
covert, sometimes reducing race to ethnicity or class. Even colorblindness is racial-
ized. Although they do not expressly mention race, terms such as -cultures of pov-
erty," "welfare cheats," "inner-city," and "underclass poverty" generally refer to
black, and often brown, people. The "racialization of space" refers to -the process by
which residential location is taken as an index of the attitudes, values, behavioral
inclinations and social norms of the kinds of people who are assumed to live [there]
... ." Susan J. Smith, Residential Segregation and the Politics of Racialization, in Ra-
cism, the City, and the State 128, 133 (Malcolm Cross & Michael Keith eds., 1993).
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live at and within the intersection of race, space, and poverty. In some
instances, the intersection is the primary defining feature of context.' 2
Within this intersection, or context, I focus on high-poverty neigh-
borhoods-that is, those with poverty rates of at least forty percent. I
also focus on people who experience the effects of concentrated pov-
erty.13 Concentrated poverty sharpens our focus in considering the
constraints and social isolation that these poor people face. As Paul
Jargowsky notes, it is very important that we take into account that
those in concentrated poverty situations represent "the percentage of
poor who not only have to cope with their own poverty, but also that
of those around them."' 4 He adds, "the concentration of poverty is
not simply about minorities' probabilities of interclass contact, but
rather about the degree to which minorities inhabit areas of extreme
deprivation, with the attendant possibility that the social milieu is
qualitatively different from that of the rest of society."'"
Almost beyond the purview of legal advocates and policy makers,
the existence of neighborhood poverty has grown dramatically since
the 1970s. From 1970 to 1990, the number of neighborhoods with at
least forty percent poor people more than doubled and the total
number of persons residing in such neighborhoods grew from 4.1 mil-
lion to eight million people. 16 The number of African Americans in
such neighborhoods increased from 2.4 million to 4.2 million, with
most of them living in highly segregated, ghetto neighborhoods. 7 La-
tinos living in barrios, or high-poverty areas, rose from 729,000 to two
million. 8 This increase was primarily driven by population growth
largely fueled by immigration, however, so in spite of this population
12. By "context" I mean literally "the interrelated conditions in which something
exists or occurs." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 283 (1990). Context is
also used to reflect the parts of a discourse that surround doctrine, policy, and practice
and throw light on the discourse's meaning. Id.
13. For a discussion of the effects of concentrated poverty, see Paul A. Jargowsky,
Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City 30 (1996).
14. Id. at 21.
15. Id. at 23. The early significant focus on concentrated poverty is found in Wil-
liam Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and
Public Policy 58 (1987). According to Wilson:
If I had to use one term to capture the differences in the experiences of low-
income families who live in the inner-city areas from the experiences of
those who live in other areas in the central city today, that term would be
concentration effects. The social transformation of the inner city [from the
1970s through the 1980s] has resulted in a disproportionate concentration of
the most disadvantaged segments of the urban black population, creating a
social milieu significantly different from the environment that existed in
these communities several decades ago.
Id.
16. Jargowsky, supra note 13, at 30.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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growth, there was insignificant change in the Latino neighborhood
poverty rate.19
In commenting on the racial and ethnic composition of high-poverty
neighborhoods, Jargowsky states: "One common impression of poor
neighborhoods is correct: they are predominantly inhabited by mem-
bers of minority groups."' In 1990, nearly 75% of those residing in
high-poverty neighborhoods were black or Latino: whites were
22.5%; blacks 49.7%; Mexicans 14.3%; Puerto Ricans 6%; Cubans
0.4%; other "Hispanics" comprised 3.6%; and other "non-Hispanics"
comprised 3.5%. 21 In 1990, while one in seven blacks-fourteen per-
cent-lived in ghettos or high-poverty neighborhoods, only one per-
cent of all (non-Hispanic) whites lived in neighborhood poverty.
Among Latinos, nineteen percent of Puerto Ricans, nine percent of
Mexicans, and three percent of Cubans lived in barrios or high-pov-
erty neighborhoods.'
This Article is no blue-print. I attempt, simply, to develop perspec-
tive, insight, and strategic concerns that will aid in representing the
inner-city poor who are trapped within the intersection of race, space,
and poverty. In what follows, I examine the nature of cause lawyering
as it may be practiced specifically on behalf of the inner-city poor-
clients who are, synergistically and simultaneously, racially and eco-
nomically subordinated within the spatially constrained and the op-
portunity-denying circumstances of ghetto and barrio life. In light of
these features, I argue that effective representation must collaborate
with these clients not only to represent them, but also to represent
their place and communities as well. Part I conceptualizes a vision of
cause lawering that responds in a left-activist way to redress the condi-
tions of racialized, inner-city poverty. The racialized, inner-city poor
experience poverty that is concentrated and community-based rather
than merely a personal trouble. Thus, part II elaborates on the con-
text and situatedness of the inner-city poor. Part III then suggests that
one response to the oppression of the inner-city poor is to adopt Ed-
ward Soja's "thirdspace" perspective to develop inner-city poor neigh-
borhoods as sites of resistance and places of radical possibility and
openness.3 Perhaps in this way we can help to develop two, almost
contradictory, types of social capital: one that is concerned with sup-
port within inner-city communities and the other with leveraging op-
portunity beyond these communities. 24
19. See id.
20. See id at 61.
21. See id. at 64.
22. See id at 70.
23. See Edward W. Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-
and-Imagined Places 22-23 (1996).
24. See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility
and the Many Faces of Social Capital, 9 Housing Pol'y Debate 177, 178 (1998).
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I. THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF CAUSE LAWYERING
This part introduces the concept of "cause lawyering," comparing it
to other models of lawyering and explaining how it can benefit inner-
city client communities. It examines the meaning of cause lawyering,
with its associated attributes and threats to the legal profession. This
part then addresses the forces that drive and direct cause lawyering in
various contexts.
A. The Concept of Cause Lawyering in Context
According to Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, our legal profes-
sion both needs and at the same time is threatened by cause lawyer-
ing.25 On the one hand, the profession needs lawyers who commit
themselves and their legal skills to furthering a vision of the good soci-
ety so that "moral activism" can put a humane face on lawyering and
"provide[ ] an appealing alternative to the value-neutral, 'hired-gun'
imagery that often dogs the legal profession."" On the other hand,
however, cause lawyers are not simply a minority of the bar, but they
represent "a deviant strain within the legal profession." 7 Cause lawy-
ering presents a profound professional threat to the dominant bar and
its forms of legal practice:
[Cause lawyers] threaten the profession by destabilizing the domi-
nant understanding of lawyering as properly wedded to moral neu-
trality and technical competence . . . . By rejecting
nonaccountability, if not partisanship, cause lawyers establish a
point from which to criticize the dominant understanding from in-
side the profession itself. They denaturalize and politicize that un-
derstanding. Cause lawyering exposes the fact that it is contingent
and constructed and, in so doing, raises the political question of
whose interests the dominant understanding serves. The result is a
threat to ongoing professional projects and the political immunity of
the legal profession and the legal process.2 8
As a deviant strain of the legal profession, cause lawyers must contin-
ually threaten and challenge dominant understandings of the profes-
sional role and the larger process within which that role is performed.
Nowhere is this more crucial than in representing the inner-city poor.
All cause lawyers appear to focus primarily on the broad stakes in-
volved in representing their client community. Sometimes the cause
25. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction
of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in Cause Lawyering, supra note 6, at 3, 3.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3-4. But see generally Robert MacCrate, "The Lost Lawyer" Regained:
The Abiding Values of the Legal Profession, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 587, 603-06 (1996)
(analyzing the devolution of values in the legal profession).
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conflicts with representing narrower client interests. 29 Cases are pri-
marily important for their significance to the cause: Is what is at stake
something that the cause lawyer deems worth fighting for?"
Although cause lawyering can be associated with causes of both the
political left and right, this Article associates it with leftist progressive
lawyering.31 Progressive lawyering is a subject that began to receive
scholarly attention during the 1980s as the viability of liberal legal ad-
vocacy diminished, within both antidiscrimination law32 and poverty
law.33 Left-activist lawyering is driven by a conviction and commit-
ment to oppose the forces of domination and to support activities of
resistance. This lawyering is not motivated by a desire to defend and
protect rights in the abstract. Instead, rights are means to political
ends.34 Far from asserting rights, the false legitimization function of
the law is constantly challenged. This is important, because "[t]he law
is a major vehicle for the maintenance of existing social and power
relations by the consent or acquiescence of the lower and middle
classes."35 As a consequence, left-activists tend to push their profes-
sional role and their organizations into areas that are politically and
professionally risky, confrontational, and controversial.'
In 1992, Gerald L6pez wrote an important book that contrasted two
modes of delivering legal services to the poor that he described as
"regnant" and "rebellious."37 As the name would suggest, regnant
29. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale Li. 470, 471 (1976).
30. See Stuart Sheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice: A Case Study
of Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in Cause Lawyering, supra note 6, at 118, 118; see
also Edgar S. Calm, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 Yale L.J. 2133, 2144-47 (1994) ('A
moral dilemma is posed wherever the cost of amplifying the client's voice is incurred
at the expense of securing remedy.").
31. For a discussion of cause lawyering as a leftist movement, see William E.
Forbath, Taking Lefts Seriously, 92 Yale LJ. 1041 (1983).
32. See KimberI6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L Rev. 1331, 1334
(1988). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for
the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 La Raza L.J. 42, 45-56 (1995)
(emphasizing the importance of political as opposed to legal strategies for Latinos in
antidiscrimination cases).
33. See, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 Stan. L
Rev. 1, 10 (1989) (discussing the problems with cause lawyering that were perceived
during the 1980s).
34. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work. A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Lawy-
ering, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 297, 300 (1996).
35. David Kairys, The Politics of Law- A Progressive Critique 5 (David Kairys
ed., 1982).
36. See Sheingold, supra note 6, at 148 n.91. Relatedly, we must often overcome
our own biases toward nonwhite clients. See Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, Reflections
from the Bottom of the WelL Racial Bias in the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor,
27 Clearinghouse Rev. 311 (1993).
37. Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive
Law Practice 11-82 (1992). In reviewing the book, Angelo Anchetta, a community
lawyer and past Executive Director of the Asian Law Caucus, writes:
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lawyers tend to maintain a disassociated power over their clients, em-
bracing the traditional lawyer-client paradigm. By contrast, "the re-
bellious idea of lawyering demands that lawyers (and those with
whom they work) nurture sensibilities and skills compatible with a
collective fight for social change. ' 38 In representing the inner-city
poor, it is arguably more important that advocates disassociate them-
selves from regnant lawyering than it is that they adopt the latter
mode. There may be other conceptions of effective representation
that do not incorporate the wholesale features of rebellious lawyering.
Indeed, effective representation stems from intervening and con-
fronting the array of opportunity-denying circumstances that oppress
the client community. There is no grand theory to instruct lawyers
how to advocate. Thus, my focus is on what lawyers should not do,
because regnant lawyering blocks efforts to recognize and develop al-
ternative approaches that are more effective.39
Regnant lawyering is directly tied to the professional socialization
and orientation of attorneys. Consider some of the characteristics of
regnant lawyers:
* Lawyers "formally represent" others.
, Lawyers choose between "service" work (resolving individual
problems) and "impact" work (advancing systemic reforms),
largely dichotomous categories.
The book's importance lies in its ability to convey, through the use of de-
tailed narratives, the experiences and problem-solving abilities that reside in
and affect everyone. By challenging existing notions of progressive legal
practice and community organizing, L6pez demonstrates how all of us ac-
commodate-and resist-change in our daily lives, and how, through work-
ing together and sharing power, we can bring about positive changes that
improve our collective existence.
Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1363, 1367 (1993). Other
reviews include Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1747
(1994); and Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer out of Progressive Lawyering, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 213 (1993). See also Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant
Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 Hastings L.J. 947, 951-54 (1992) (exam-
ining the notions of rebellious and regnant lawyering).
38. L6pez, supra note 37, at 38.
39. In warning of the danger of even cause lawyers associating with the regnant
style of practice, I am not suggesting that civil rights lawyers or poverty lawyers have
become the tools of oppression. In resistance to versions of critical scholarship, Gary
Blasi sounds a cautionary note that I am trying to heed. As he observes, "The critical
gaze rarely falls on the mirror: it is about the practice of others. This may explain a
bit of why this scholarship has had little impact beyond law schools." Gary L. Blasi,
What's a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U.
Miami L. Rev. 1063, 1088 (1994) (emphasis added). I agree with Blasi that our critical
scholarship must acknowledge many voices and points of view, including those of the
practicing advocates. I thus hope that this Article falls outside that scholarship which
"sometimes devalues and silences the voices and experiences of the human beings
who are trying to function as progressive lawyers quite as thoroughly as those lawyers
sometimes devalue and silence the voices of their clients." Id. at 1089.
1934 [Vol. 67
A CALL TO CONTEXT
" Lawyers set up their offices to facilitate formal representation in
service or impact work.
" Lawyers litigate more than they do anything else.
" Lawyers understand "community education" as a label for dif-
fuse, marginal, and uncritical work (variations on the canned "af-
ter-dinner talk about law"), and "organizing" as a catchword for
sporadic, supplemental mobilization (variations on sit-ins, sit-
downs, and protests).
* Lawyers consider themselves the preeminent problem-solvers in
most situations they find themselves trying to alter.
" Lawyers connect only loosely to other institutions or groups in
their communities, and these connections almost always focus on
lawyers' use of institutions or groups for some aspect of the case
in which they serve as formal representatives.
" Lawyers have only a modest grasp on how large structures-re-
gional, national, and international, political, economic, and cul-
tural-shape and respond to the status quo.
" Lawyers suspect that subordination of all sorts cyclically recreates
itself in certain subcultures, thereby preventing people from help-
ing themselves and taking advantage of many social services and
educational opportunities.
" Lawyers believe that subordination can be successfully fought if
professionals, particularly lawyers, assume leadership in pro-ac-
tive campaigns that sometimes "involve" the subordinated.
" Lawyers do not know and try little to learn whether and how for-
mal changes in law penetrate the ives of subordinated people.
" Lawyers understand their profession as an honorable calling and
see themselves as aesthetic if not political heroes, working largely
alone to make statements through their (more than their clients')
cases about society's injustices.40
Leftist cause lawyers are inclined to smugly dismiss these features as
foreign to their personal and professional orientation, values, and
commitment. But a genuine, good-faith commitment to an-
tisubordination work does not necessarily insulate one from regnant
lawyering. Indeed, the regnant mode of lawyering is cultivated under
the pressing circumstances of practice. Those circumstances include
the social and cultural distance between lawyers and clients, the occa-
sional but significant mutual distrust and disrespect between lawyers
and clients, the overwhelming crush of client demand, the burn-out of
practice, the differing, sometimes contradictory worldviews of lawyers
and clients, and lawyers' self-righteous arrogance. Moreover, its culti-
vation takes place regardless of whether the practice emphasizes indi-
vidual client cases, group or institutional impact cases, or mobilization
40. L6pez, supra note 37, at 24.
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advocacy. It takes place whether the lawyer is non-white or white,
male or female, gay or straight, or a stranger to the community or a
former resident who has now moved on.
The first step for most of us in becoming effective advocates, then, is
to break away from the regnant idea of lawyering. The client commu-
nity, as well, must unequivocally indicate that regnant lawyers are not
welcome. This strong client stand will not be made in the desperate
cases of individual clients facing evictions, welfare cuts, consumer
fraud, employment discrimination, and the like. It can and should be
made, however, whenever lawyers attempt impact litigation, legisla-
tive or administrative advocacy, base-building and mobilization, or
other aspects of lawyering that extend beyond resolving private dis-
putes. In other words, at the cutting edges of practice, there is no
room for regnant lawyering. It is out of place.
In contrast to regnant lawyers, rebellious lawyers connect with the
community they serve and make collaborative advocacy a key prem-
ise: lawyers must know how to work with the client community, not
just on its behalf.41 There must be collaboration with professional and
lay allies, including a willingness to be educated by them. Rebellious
lawyers must "ground their work in the lives and in the communities
of the subordinated themselves. ' '42 They must continually assess
probable interaction between both legal and non-legal approaches to
problems. They must adopt a problem-solving orientation, learning
"how to work with others in brainstorming, designing, and executing
strategies aimed at responding immediately to particular problems
and, more generally, at fighting social and political subordination. '43
Finally, this orientation toward advocacy must nurture the appropriate
sensibilities and skills that are "compatible with a collective fight for
social change. 44
B. The Direction of Cause Lawyering in Context
Left-activist, non-regnant cause lawyering must first be community-
based, because the poverty we confront is primarily situated at the
intersection of race, space, and poverty. Individuals, in this context,
are poor primarily because their families and neighborhoods are poor.
Although "community" is a problematical term, 45 it is nonetheless apt
41. See id. at 37-38.
42. Id. at 38.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and So-
cial Change, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 415, 448 (1996) ("I want my clients to feel
that we are all challenging the system together and that, although I have a distinct
role, I am their comrade in a common struggle.").
45. As Regina Austin points out: "Though the ubiquitous experience of racism
provides the basis for group solidarity, differences of gender, class, geography, and
political affiliations keep blacks apart. These differences may be the best evidence
that a single black community no longer exists." Regina Austin, "The Black Commit-
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in the context of the client poverty to be addressed here. Community,
here, is not a romantic abstraction, but rather the site of material dep-
rivation and relations that are formed to cope with oppressive circum-
stances. It is not, however, simply an adaptation to a culture of
poverty or a culture of segregation. It is homeplace.46 As George
Revill argues:
The value of community as a concept in this context is that it throws
into prominence the tensions between ... peoples and places. It is
not that it enables us to identify a stable or even dominant set of
social and cultural characteristics by which a particular place or
group of people might be identified. Rather, community focuses in-
terest on the processes that create a sense of stability front a contested
terrain in which versions of place and notions of identity are sup-
ported by different groups and individuals with varying powers to
articulate their positions.47
The community-based notion of cause lawyering not only allows us
to situate our clients as a social group, but also compels us to confront
their problems as public issues that reflect systemic "contradictions"
or "antagonisms" rather than as "personal troubles.""8 This in turn
directs us to adopt a mission of social justice that redresses oppres-
sion. Thus, social justice furthers liberation and entails establishing
freedom from the features of oppression. These features, as identified
by Iris Young, are exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cul-
tural imperialism, and violence.4 9 David Harvey would add "a further
dimension concerning freedom from the oppressive ecological conse-
quences of others' actions. '50 Significantly, within the context of in-
ner-city poverty, these multiple forms of oppression often coalesce in
nity," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1817
(1992) (footnote omitted).
46. Austin observes:
Only blacks who are bound by shared economic, social, and political con-
straints, and who pursue their freedom through affective engagement with
each other, live in real black communities. To be a part of a real black com-
munity requires that one go Home every once in a while and interact with
the folks. To keep up one's membership in such a community requires that
one do something on-site.
Id.; see also John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hew-
ing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair", 143 U. Pa. L Rev. 1233, 1271
(1995) [hereinafter Calmore, Racialized Space] ("When there is nowhere to run and
nowhere to hide, people must make a stand in place, at one's home base. For many of
the inner-city poor, this is their predicament.").
47. George Revill, Reading Rosehill: Community, Identity and Inner-City Derby,
in Place and the Politics of Identity 117, 120 (Michael Keith & Steven Pile eds., 1993)
(emphasis added).
48. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination 8-9 (1959) ("Perhaps the most
fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination works is between 'the per-
sonal troubles of milieu' and 'the public issues of social structure."').
49. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 48-63 (1990).
50. David Harvey, Class Relations, Social Justice and the Politics of Difference, in
Place and the Politics of Identity, supra note 47, at 41, 56.
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synergistically interlocking ways.51 They constitute the packaged op-
portunity-denying circumstances that must be redressed. They direct
our responsive intervention as legal advocates and they map our social
justice projects.
Our social justice project's primary focus must be on helping people
to break free from the interlocking features of oppression. Oppres-
sion is at the heart of a condition-directed orientation toward re-
dress. 2 According to Marilyn Frye, a ubiquitous feature of
oppression is "the double bind-situations in which options are re-
duced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty."53 Over
the years of practicing poverty law from Roxbury to Watts, I was con-
tinually struck by the apparently optionless world that most of my cli-
ents inhabited. I never associated it with oppression, but rather I saw
it as a lack of social and monetary capital. I continued to believe in
the myth of Horatio Alger. I simply failed to see the predicament of
my clients as oppression-as something that was group-based, struc-
tured, and systemic. The life of the oppressed "is confined and shaped
by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and
hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in such a
way as to catch one between and among them and restrict or penalize
motion in any direction."54 The constraint is analogous to that of liv-
ing within a cage where, in Frye's view, "all avenues, in every direc-
tion, are blocked or booby trapped."55 Thus, many of the problems
my clients brought to me were recurring: another eviction, another
welfare cut, another police beating, another inability to pay bills, an
endless and miscellaneous list of booby traps. I did not see that they
were linked problems that represented a cage-like structure.
When I represented white working-class clients in Hayward, Cali-
fornia in the mid-1970s, I did not really appreciate the race-based ex-
acerbation of poverty that distinguished them from my black and
Latino clients. At that time, I was not sharp enough to see the inter-
section between race and class that I came to see much later in the
1980s. I saw my minority clients as being in a similar boat as the white
poor. I knew that Appalachian poverty was different from Harlem
poverty, but it was still primarily a class experience that was being
played out in different locations. It is the feature of racialized pov-
erty, however, that calls attention to group specificity and the fact that
oppression is primarily a function of social group association. 6 The
compounded oppression of race-class is the qualitative difference be-
51. See id. at 56-57.
52. See Calmore, Critical Race Theory, supra note 2, at 2206.
53. Marilyn Frye, Oppression, in Power, Privilege, and Law: A Civil Rights
Reader 60, 60-61 (Leslie Bender & Dann Braveman eds., 1995).
54. Id. at 62.
55. Id.
56. See Young, supra note 49, at 42 ("Oppression refers to structural phenomena
that immobilize or diminish a group.").
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tween black-brown poverty and white poverty. My white clients cer-
tainly experienced the hardships of poverty. But they generally did
not experience these hardships as a social group that was oppressed at
the intersection of race and poverty. Almost never did they experi-
ence them at the tripartite intersection of race, space, and poverty.
When we look at oppression, we must look at the specific social group
experience and respond accordingly.
We must also pay attention to the structured aspect of poverty.
Clearly poor people must take responsibility for their lives and battle
the forces that might compel them to engage in dysfunctional behav-
ior. But this responsibility is not enough, because, as Young points
out:
Oppression in the structural sense is part of the basic fabric of a
society, not a function of a few people's choice or policies. You
won't eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid of the rules
or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematicall
reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions.
The inner-city poor are oppressed by "the normal ongoing processes
of everyday life."'58 When we speak of empowerment and transforma-
tion, we should be referring not only to disrupting stark hierarchy and
power imbalances, but also to changing the processes of everyday life
as lived by those within the client community.59
Finally, cause lawyering must develop a critical vocabulary to pres-
ent race and racism as part of the poverty story. Here, critical race
theory can be useful to the practice." It informs us that race and ra-
cism are always concepts in formation. Our notion of race and our
experience with racism do not represent fixed, static phenomena. Ra-
cism is more than the intentional behavior of the occasional bad actor.
Racism mutates and multiplies, creating a range of racisms. We must
be able to bring up issues of race and racism without the terms always
leading to fear, alienation, and off-point debate. There is no such
thing as colorblind poverty. We must appreciate that because the in-
ner-city poor are approximately seventy-five percent black and brown,
inner-city poverty itself is "raced."'" One simply cannot seek eco-
57. Iris Marion Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in Power, Privilege, and Law. A
Civil Rights Reader, supra note 53, at 66-67.
58. Id. at 67-68.
59. See id
60. See john a. powell, Race and Poverty: A New Focus for Legal Services, 27
Clearinghouse Rev. 299, 300-04 (1993); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America:
Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43
Hastings LJ. 749, 750 (1992).
61. As john powell explains, in a top-down process "race operates as a verb before
it assumes significance as a noun." john a. powell, The "Racing" of American Society:
Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 Law & Ineq. J. 99, 104
(1997). Similarly, Kendall Thomas explains that "we are 'raced' through a constella-
tion of practices that construct and control racial subjectivities." Kendall Thomas, The
Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 Va. L Rev. 1805,
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nomic justice and equal treatment for the poor by separating the quest
from considerations of the raced aspects of context, history, social or-
ganization, institutional arrangements, and culture.62
As Michael Omi notes, "racial and ethnic categories are often the
effects of political interpretation and struggle and those categories in
turn have political effects."'63 Additionally, Omi reminds us that while
we often correlate race with such matters as residential patterns, job
qualifications, culture, academic achievement, criminal behavior, wel-
fare dependency, and intelligence, we do so "without problemetizing
the concept of race itself."64 Thus, we fail to appreciate the shifting
parameters that mark the consideration of race-"how group interests
are conceived, status is ascribed, agency is attained and roles per-
formed. ' '65 If our advocacy on behalf of the inner-city poor fails to
incorporate this understanding, we are likely not only to be ineffec-
tive, but also to provide a disservice to the client community. We will
disrespect the fullness of their predicament. The changes we seek will
not be sufficiently fundamental.
II. REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN POVERTY AND PLACE
A key aspect of cause lawyering is understanding that individual
clients cannot be treated as separate from their racial, geographical,
and class identities. Rather, as this part demonstrates, race, class, and
"place" often converge to inform both individual client identity and
societal perceptions of certain groups.
A. The Significance of Intersectional Analysis
In the early 1970s, Robert Blauner observed that "[r]ace affects
class formation and class influences racial dynamics in ways that have
not yet been adequately investigated."66 The focus on race-class inter-
sectionality aids in furthering this badly needed investigation of the
mutual race-class/class-race dynamics along with their mutual causes
and effects. Intersectional analysis also aids in challenging essentialist
conceptions of identity that fail to take into account that racial iden-
tity does not reduce itself to a monolithic experience, but, rather, is
variously constituted in differentiating ways-such as race, gender,
1806-07 (1993). Regarding the racing of Asian-Pacific Americans, see Natsu Taylor
Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in
American Law, 76 Or. L. Rev. 261, 289-95 (1997).
62. See john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spenzer, Remaking the Urban University
for the Urban Student. Talking About Race, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 1247, 1286 (1998).
63. Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15
Law & Ineq. J. 7, 23 (1997).
64. Id. at 21.
65. Id.
66. Robert Blauner, Racial Oppression in America 28-29 (1972).
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and class-within a single social group.67 It also aids in looking at the
features and dynamics of context, framing the interaction and interre-
lationships of race and class, of racism and economic class subjuga-
tion.68 Hence, this Article draws attention to the plight of a very
specific group of poor clients. I focus on those who are caught within
the oppressive "intersectional trap" that Chester Hartman refers to as
"the ways our society creates and maintains a large stratum of the
population who are both poor and subject to subordination by the
dominant white majority. ' 69 I seek to extend the intersection of race
and class, and moreover, resituate it more clearly within the con-
straining, concentrated, isolating circumstances that are uniquely asso-
ciated with the spatial dimensions of ghetto and barrio life.7"
Although I narrowly define my claimant class or client community,
black and brown people constitute nearly seventy-five percent of the
eight million people who are living within neighborhoods of high
poverty.
The issues confronting the inner-city poor point to a series of
problems that we can trace to the inter-connected dynamics of racial-
ized poverty, residential segregation, and the long history of racism.
67. See Angela R. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1990).
68. See Calmore, Exploring, supra note 2, at 215. Intersectionality is most devel-
oped within the school of critical-race feminism. See Critical Race Feminism: A
Reader 7-80 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997). Much of the theoretical work on
intersectionality has been undertaken by Kimberld Crenshaw, who describes it as a
concept to denote "the various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the
multiple dimensions of black women's ... experiences." Kimberld Williams Cren-
shaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Move-
ment 357, 358 (Kimberld Williams Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). The experiences of
black women, for example, are not fixed within traditional boundaries of race or gen-
der. The intersection of racism and sexism must be taken into account to appreciate
how these women's experiences of subordination cannot be captured completely by
viewing separately the race or gender dimensions of their experiences. See id. Finally,
although intersectionality is closely related to antiessentialism, it is distinguishable in
that intersectionality recognizes both multiple dimensions to identity and the ongoing
necessity of group politics. See id. at 375. As Crenshaw claims:
Recognizing that identity politics takes place at the site where categories
intersect thus seems more fruitful than challenging the possibility of talking
about categories at all. Through an awareness of intersectionality, we can
better acknowledge and ground differences among us and negotiate the
means by which these differences will find expression in constructing group
politics.
Id. at 377.
69. Chester Hartman, Editor's Introduction to Double Exposure: Poverty and
Race in America at xix, xix (Chester Hartman ed., 1997).
70. See Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 46, at 1248 n.76. Perhaps due to the
designation of Asians as a model minority (which is partly true, but mostly a myth),
Asian poverty has received little attention by legal scholars. Regarding Asians and
racialized space, however, see Andrew L. S. Leong, A Practical Guide to Establishing
an Asian Law Clinic: Reflections on the Chinatown Clinical Program at Boston Col-
lege Law School, 2 Asian Pac. Am. LJ. 83 (1994).
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In order to understand the range of racisms in the United States we
must appreciate the role that class plays and the relationship between
race and class. The most constraining aspect of this relationship may
be the way in which it is manifested in ghetto and barrio life. Thus, we
must have a comprehensive view of the conditions to be redressed.
We must recognize, as john powell observes, that "[r]ace and racism
have had, and continue to have, a profound impact not only on who is
poor in our society but also on the meaning of poverty and the policies
that we adopt and fail to adopt."'"
In looking at the racial and ethnic data regarding neighborhood
poverty, I am struck by two things. First, it is really not a significant
problem for whites, as only one percent of all non-Hispanic whites live
in poor neighborhoods. Second, for this reason, racism may continue
to cultivate broad societal neglect and block efforts at grand-scale re-
dress. As John Payne observes: "Racial discrimination is not far be-
low the surface of economic discrimination. Our society simply would
not tolerate the amount of poverty found in black and other minority
communities if whites were proportionally as poor as these less-fa-
vored groups."72 I believe that Payne's observation is an accurate re-
flection of today's neglect of race-based need. Worse, his observation
reflects on a legacy where the intersection of race and poverty has
dampened the nation's commitment to bold anti-poverty redress.
Indeed, Hugh Heclo explicitly ties a retreat from fundamental anti-
poverty policy to the disproportionate numbers of blacks to be af-
fected. He observes that during the 1960s "[t]he minority status of all
blacks left antipoverty policy highly vulnerable to white liberal doubts
and antiblack racist sentiment."73 White support for racial justice re-
mained strong as long as moral issues were salient in the civil rights
movement-issues associated with addressing such matters as state-
sanctioned segregation, political disenfranchisement, and antiblack vi-
olence, largely in the South. Support waned, however, when the
movement's attention was redirected to the economic aspects of racial
inequality. Heclo states, "[a]s the civil rights movement moved north
after 1964 and pressed demands for open housing, busing, and affirm-
ative action, the northern white civil rights constituency began melting
away and undermining the political foundations of antipoverty pol-
71. john a. powell, Introduction to Double Exposure: Poverty and Race in
America, supra note 69, at 3, 12.
72. John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mount Laurel: Is Affordable Housing Fair
Housing?, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 361, 370 (1988); see also Deirdre Martinez & Sonia
M. Perez, Diverse Needs, Diverse Solutions: Toward a Latino Anti-Poverty Agenda, 1
Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 55, 55-56 (1993) ("[U]nlike other American workers, the
large majority of Hispanics are unable to depend on their jobs for economic stability
.. .. 1).
73. Hugh Heclo, The Political Foundations of Antipoverty Policy, in Fighting Pov-
erty: What Works and What Doesn't 312, 323 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H.
Weinberg eds., 1986).
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icy."' 7 4 Many, perhaps most, Legal Services attorneys and other law-
yers for the poor may have been deterred or detoured by the right-
wing backlash against challenging the economic aspects of racial ine-
quality. Too often we have simply treated poverty law practice as re-
dressing the problems of poor people who were largely fungible
clients who stood on common ground, as poor people. We have shied
away from interjecting a racial element into the advocacy. This has
been, and continues to be, a terrible flaw in our practice.7"
B. The Anchor of Context Racialized Class-Space
As I mentioned earlier, there are many ways in which inner-city
poverty is different from other poverty. Those who experience it live
under harsh and interlocking circumstances that reinforce the ele-
ments of poverty in ways that are very different from those of other
poor people. Not only is their space generally racialized, but also they
are socially isolated, geographically constrained, and, for many, their
poverty is concentrated within high-poverty neighborhoods. Thus,
they experience poverty not simply as individuals, but as members of
a poor community, which is why I refer to them as clients in poverty
and place.
The racialized inner-city poor, particularly African Americans and
Puerto Ricans, experience concentrated poverty in their neighbor-
hoods that is compounded by a spatial and geographic marginalization
that deepens their intersectional racist and economic subordination.
Within this context of ghetto and barrio poverty, geographic racism
operates in a way that manifests the effects of what Michael Harring-
ton has called "the new poverty."76 In the context of past poverty, the
poor suffered from deprivation, constrained opportunity, and ex-
ploitation. These marked their economic inequality. A significant
segment of today's poor, in contrast, are superfluous not only to the
economy, but also to the nation's societal organization. 77 To appreci-
ate their isolation and expendability, it is important to understand that
social organization is a comprehensive context. William Julius Wilson
characterizes social organization as "the working arrangements of so-
ciety, including those that have emanated from previous arrange-
ments, that specifically involve processes of ordering relations and
74. Id
75. According to Florence Roisman and Philip Tegeler: "Although many legal
services clients are members of racial or ethnic minority groups and are restricted to
housing that is both separate and unequal, past years saw relatively little race-based
housing litigation by legal services attorneys." Florence Vagman Roisman & Philip
Tegeler, Improving and Expanding Housing Opportunities for Poor People of Color
Recent Developments in Federal and State Courts-Part I: Race-Based Federal Claims,
24 Clearinghouse Rev. 312, 313 (1990).
76. Michael Harrington, The New American Poverty 9 (1984) ("The poverty of
the eighties is different from all those poverties that preceded it.").
77. See id. at 231-36, 252-55.
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actions with respect to given social ends, and that represent the mate-
rial outcomes of those processes. 78
The condition to be redressed under these circumstances is the face
of oppression that Iris Young calls marginalization: "Marginalization
is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression. A whole category
of people is expelled from useful participation in social life and thus
potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermi-
nation., 79 Young also notes that "increasingly in the United States
racial oppression occurs in the form of marginalization rather than
exploitation. Marginals are people the system of labor cannot or will
not use."8 Similarly, Katz characterizes marginalization as "the pro-
cess whereby some combination of factors-for instance, technologi-
cal change, racial competition, or government action-pushes groups
to the edges of the labor force, leaving them redundant, unwanted, or
confined to the worst jobs."'" As a fundamental criticism, marginal-
ization theory must be recognized before society can attempt to re-
dress the conditions and lived experiences of a significant number of
the inner-city poor. Moreover, marginalization should direct the at-
tention of cause lawyering in seeking to redress particular injustices.
Peter Marcuse identifies three striking spatial developments that
have occurred since the 1970s.82 Urban space is now arranged in a
hierarchy that reflects new patterns of increased economic, social, and
political separation. Legal advocacy on behalf of the inner-city poor
must recognize the interrelationships at work here and our practice
must be responsive to them. Within the spatial hierarchy, at bottom is
the largely abandoned city, in between is the suburban city, and at top
is the luxury city. These spatial developments include the transforma-
tion of earlier racial and ethnic ghettos, whose white-ethnic occupants
experienced the ghetto as a point of departure, into the present ghet-
tos that society now excludes, abandons, and separates from others by
social, economic, and often physical barriers.
A second development is a qualitatively new phase of suburbaniza-
tion. No longer dependent on the central city for employment, serv-
ices, or cultural or entertainment outlets, there is an increasing
"totalizing suburban development, in which 'edge cities' are created
combining residential, business, social, and cultural areas, removed
from older central cities, overlaid on earlier patterns of suburbaniza-
tion."83 While white suburbs have historically represented racial and
class exclusion, there has been some dependence on central cities and
78. Wilson, supra note 15, at 132-33.
79. Young, supra note 49, at 53.
80. Id. Unfair treatment of Latino and Asian immigrant workers, however, may
reflect racist exploitation.
81. Katz, supra note 3, at 452.
82. See Peter Marcuse, The Ghetto of Exclusion and the Fortified Enclave: New
Patterns in the United States, 41 Am. Behav. Scientist 311, 311 (1997).
83. Id. at 311-12.
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some relation to a region as metropolitan. The totalizing environment
of the suburb is a new and dramatic increase in localistic insularity and
self-sufficiency. This development parallels the transformation of up-
per-class living areas, which are similarly totalizing, as separate, often
gated communities. In Marcuse's view, "[t]he three developments are
intimately connected with each other and mutually reinforcing." S"
While not entirely new, these developments "are new phenomena that
represent a combination of old and well-known processes with ele-
ments that are substantively new."'85
Traditional ghettos were sites of opportunity through exploitation.
The residents were confined by dominant interests not only to facili-
tate a strong measure of social control but also to channel ghetto ac-
tivities in a way to further dominant economic interests.s6 The new
ghetto of the excluded is very different. According to Marcuse, here
race and class intersect "in a spatially concentrated area where resi-
dents' activities are excluded from the economic life of the surround-
ing society, which does not profit significantly from its existence."'
Society is less inclined to use these residents, even under circum-
stances of exploitation, because "of fear that their activities, not con-
trolled, may endanger the dominant social peace."8s
This ghetto, moreover, is conceptually different from an enclave.
An enclave is also a spatially concentrated area, but one within which
"members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity
or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of enhancing their
economic, social, political, and/or cultural development."'  Tran-
scending class, many African-American, Latino, and Asian communi-
ties are spatially organized as cultural and/or immigrant enclaves.
Many suburbs are also enclaves, but they are racially or economically
exclusionary. As Marcuse says:
The exclusionary enclave, although not new, plays a new role today,
both quantitatively and qualitatively. It differs from other forms of
enclaves (although there are shared characteristics) in that its resi-
dents, intermediate and insecure in their economic, political, and
social relationships to the outside community, wish to "protect"
themselves from a perceived danger from below. 90
Marcuse's description is particularly helpful in distinguishing the black
ghetto today from the ethnic or cultural enclaves of white immigrants.
Often those who rely on an equality of opportunity policy fail to ap-
preciate this distinction. Moreover, the black ghetto of exclusion is
84. Id. at 312.
85. Id. at 313.
86. See id at 314.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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different from the Mexican barrio, with the latter often representing
an enclave. Puerto Ricans, largely concentrated in New York, resem-
ble blacks living in the ghetto of exclusion. Hence, understanding why
blacks and Latinos have come to occupy their place in society and
how they can move on, will call for group-specific, different analyses.
In many ways, Latinos may be subjected to racist discrimination and
exploitation more than to racist marginalization.
As we view the context of space within Marcuse's descriptive
framework, we see relationships that reinforce the marginalization
and exploitation of the inner-city poor. We also see features that belie
the story of the nation as an open society. This reality renders quite
problematic remedies that are predicated on the civil rights tenets of
colorblindness, individual equality of opportunity, and integration
through assimilation. We also see how much of the inner-city poor's
subordination is place-directed from one space to another.
If we enter the context of poverty described here, it is not enough to
direct intervention efforts at what occurs within poor communities.
Rather, we must affect inter-spatial relationships. Spatial organization
within the ghetto is now in a new relationship to related spatial organ-
ization. This geographic separation of blacks primarily, but also some
Latinos, has important political consequences. Through the process of
racialization it transforms many urban problems, particularly those as-
sociated with living in the city, into black and Latino problems. In-
deed, the array of problems associated with city life get reduced to the
black and brown poor, so that they become the problem.91 As Mar-
garet Weir notes, "[t]his geo-political separation exacerbates the dis-
connection of the black [and brown] poor from whites, as the fate of
the city becomes not a shared interest, but part of a battle over how
resources will be distributed across political boundaries."'
From within the client community's context of lived experience and
in collaboration with that community, how to intervene more effec-
tively in this allocation of resources battle is a fundamental problem to
be solved. Moreover, this battle is tied to issues of power and collec-
tive identity. This is particularly true when considered in light of Mar-
cuse's analysis, because within his spatial hierarchy there are virtually
no perceived mutual interests that would motivate groups to work to-
gether across boundaries. Indeed, from within each dominant group's
boundaries, they look inward to perpetuate an insular, defensive local-
ism that personifies the racialized inner-city poor as threats to their
personal safety and their neighborhood's quality of life. Rigid exclu-
sion of those below is the watchword.
91. See Margaret Weir, From Equal Opportunity to "The New Social Contract":
Race and the Politics of the American "Underclass", in Racism, the City and the State,
supra note 11, at 93, 104.
92. Id. (citation omitted).
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Under these circumstances, I am not sure what access to the main-
stream "opportunity structure" 93 means, in practical terms, for those
at the subordinating intersection of race, space, and poverty. Thus,
for example, as Jargowsky points out, "[g]hetto dispersal, mobility
strategies, and enterprise zones have a common flaw: they have little
effect on the economic and social systems that give rise to geographic
fragmentation of metropolitan areas."94 The aspiration, as he says,
must be "to find a new and viable structure for metropolitan areas in
the twenty-first century, a larger urban community rather than an ag-
glomeration of separate and antagonistic places. '"9 1
C. Beyond Location: The Inner-City as a Place
In looking at the spatial dimensions of living, we usually refer to
location rather than place. In buying a house we are reminded by
realtors that the three most important values are "location, location,
location." Location attaches or detaches us from a viable opportunity
structure. As Douglas Massey observes: "Where you live determines
the chances you get in this world .... It determines the school your
children go to, the crime you're exposed to, the peer influences on
your children. If you're isolated from the mainstream, it's not a fair
world, it's not a fair contest." 96 Similarly, Gary Orfield states:
[A] family's spatial location determines so much in our sprawling,
highly segregated metropolitan areas. It not only determines
whether or not one's children will grow up in a multiracial setting
with friends of different groups but it also determines the quality of
schools, the level of municipal services, increases in housing value,
relative tax burdens, ease of access to work, safety, and much else.97
These observations focus on location instrumentalism-a geogra-
phy of opportunity that "locates" white space as privileged over
colored space. Location is viewed as objective, neutral, and relatively
fixed. As locations are compared, some are deemed desirable and
others undesirable. The danger here is that those who reside in the
latter locations are also deemed undesirable or helpless. We write off
certain locations and we write off those who live there. In distinguish-
ing location from place, we can come into the lives of the client com-
munity and hear their counter-stories to inform us of their definition
of their situation, because their place is the site of their identity and
93. George C. Galster, Polarization, Place, and Race, in Race, Poverty, and Amer-
ican Cities 186, 215 (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996).
94. Jarogowsky, supra note 13, at 206.
95. Id. at 213.
96. Isabel Wilkerson, Study Finds Segregation in Cities Vorse Titan Scientists
Imagined, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1989, at A6 (quoting Douglas S. Massey).
97. Gary Orfield, The Movement for Housing Integration: Rationale and the Na-
ture of the Challenge, in Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy 18, 18 (John M.
Goering ed., 1986).
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action. It is a source of their self-described, rather than imposed, cul-
tural meaning. Their space is much more than where they are located.
It is their place.
The distinction between "location" and "place" is more than a play
on words. For example, J. Nicholas Entrikin argues that "the signifi-
cance of place is associated with the fact that as actors we are always
situated in place and that the context of our actions contribute to our
sense of identity."98 He adds that the significance of place is also
linked to the "situatedness" and related issues of self-identity and ac-
tion.99 Within ghetto and barrio life, place and identity are tied to-
gether and bonded by culture. It is not necessarily a culture of
poverty. It is a culture of resistance to oppression. It is a culture of
survival. It is, most importantly, a culture of making do and progress-
ing against the odds, in spite of residing in a poor location. It is in
place that agency is exercised. It is where personal identity is forged
with collective identity.
We assign values to places in relation to our projects. It is where
base building must occur. As Yi-Fu Tuan explains: "Place is not only
a fact to be explained in the broader frame of space, but it is also a
reality to be clarified and understood from the perspectives of the
people who have given it meaning."' 100 When space is reduced to loca-
tion the inner-city poor are turned into objects to be manipulated
within the built environment and an instrumental rationality is exer-
cised to their detriment. According to Stephen Haymes: "[P]eople
and things are given importance only in terms of their function with
respect to locations. Such a perception favors those groups whose in-
terests dominate decisions about the organization of space."' 0'
This subordinating spatial organization is illustrated in suburban
formation, urban renewal and displacement, exclusionary zoning, gen-
trification, public housing site selection, and environmental inequities.
It is illustrated in the spatial hierarchy that Marcuse has described,
consisting of the ghetto of the excluded, the totalizing suburb, and the
luxury citadel.
Thus, we must join inner-city client communities in our shared rec-
ognition that "all spatialities are political because they are the (covert)
medium and (disguised) expression of asymmetrical relations of
power."'1 2 This means that legal advocacy of impact must join in the
client community's challenges to that hegemony which is expressed in
98. Stephen Nathan Haymes, Race, Culture, and the City: A Pedagogy for Black
Urban Struggle 89 (1995) (quoting J. Nicholas Entrikin).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 100 (quoting Yi-Fu Than).
101. Id. at 92.
102. Michael Keith & Steve Pile, Introduction Part 2: The Place of Politics, in Place
and the Politics of Identity, supra note 47, at 22, 38.
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terms of place, politics, and identity. Failure here is to retreat from
the necessary cutting edge of cause lawyering.
III. ADVOCACY WITHIN THIRDSPACE: DEVELOPING
SOCIAL CAPITAL
This part examines Edward Soja's and bell hooks's "thirdspace"
perspective in an effort to restructure inner-city poor neighborhoods.
It also looks at the effects of the designation "underclass" and the
importance of the connection between social capital and housing
policy.
A. The Real-and-Imagined Inner-City of "Thirdspace"
Among others, Edward Soja and bell hooks have conceptualized a
"thirdspace" that enables us to re-imagine space. Together, Soja and
hooks attempt to move us beyond traditional binarianims and into a
thirdspace that is rooted in a recombinational and radically open per-
spective. Soja adopts what he calls a critical strategy of "thirding-as-
Othering" in an attempt "to open up our spatial imaginaries to ways
of thinking and acting politically that respond to all binarisms, to any
attempt to confine thought and political action to only two alterna-
tives, by interjecting an-Other set of choices." 10 3
Soja is not suggesting that binary choice should be rejected categor-
ically, but, rather, that this choice be placed within a creative process
of restructuring. In this way, we can draw "selectively and strategi-
cally from the two opposing categories to open new alternatives."" °
Binary choices include historical and sociological modernism and
postmodernism, and integration and community enrichment. Soja
theorizes a thirdspace that would provide "for a more open and com-
binatorial perspective.' 0 5 Hence, thirdspace represents "a creative
recombination and extension, one that builds on a Firstspace perspec-
tive that is focused on the 'real' material world and a Secondspace
perspective that interprets this reality through 'imagined' representa-
tions of spatiality.' 0 6 Thirdspace puts us on a journey to "a multiplic-
ity of real-and-imagined places.' 110 7
In order to deal in thirdspace, we must become ambidextrous advo-
cates, akin to a switch hitter in baseball. Like a switch hitter,
"[m]odernist identity politics has always had to face reactionary hege-
monic resistance and reformist liberal diversion."" 8 While we clearly
103. Soja, supra note 23, at 5.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Edward Soja and Barbara Hooper, The Spaces that Difference Makes: Some
Notes on the Geographical Margins of the New Cultural Politics, in Place and the Poli-
tics of Identity, supra note 47, at 183, 187.
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identify the former as "them," we often fail to include ourselves, as
legal advocates, among the reformist liberal diversions against whom
the inner-city poor must also battle. Perhaps, by adopting a third-
space sensitivity, we can avoid harming the client community with our
friendly fire.109
In a related way, bell hooks directs us to a counter-hegemonic form
of spatial praxis. Our advocacy must incorporate more of a bottom-up
perspective, not exclusively, but more than we presently do. This ties
in with the thirdspace notion of disordering modernist binaries-law-
yer and client perspectives, for example-and promoting new and
radically different cultural politics, hooks points out that
"[u]nderstanding marginality as position and place of resistance is cru-
cial for oppressed, exploited, colonized people."110 For those of us
who reside outside of the intersection of race, space, and poverty, but
who desire to enter, intervene, and work with those who do, this ob-
servation would help us to understand how they are not overwhelmed
by their pain and deprivation. It explains how they resist certain
hopelessness and "despair, a deep nihilism [that could penetrate] in a
destructive way."''
Here, too, we can better appreciate why we cannot come into the
picture with canned claims and prayers for relief. We must be open to
being used by the client community in ways that they deem appropri-
ate. We can provide technical assistance and advocacy perspective; we
can enhance their stories; and we can help them to leverage their posi-
tions. We cannot eliminate poverty; we cannot really move very many
out of poverty. But we can join the political project by occupying the
real-and-imagined worlds on the margin and helping the community
to reclaim these spaces as places of radical openness and possibility.
Community building from thirdspace means that we attempt to fur-
ther establish these communities as:
[T]he sites where one's radical subjectivity can be activated and
practiced in conjunction with the radical subjectivities of others. It
is thus a spatiality of inclusion rather than exclusion, a spatiality
where radical subjectivities can multiply, connect, and combine in
polycentric communities of identity and resistance; where "frag-
109. Accordingly Soja explains:
This creative spatialization involves more than wrapping texts in appealing
spatial metaphors. It is a vital discursive turn that both contextualizes the
new cultural politics and facilitates its conceptual re-visioning around the
empowerment of multiplicity, the construction of combinatorial rather than
competitively fragmented and separated communities of resistance. It also
leads to a new spatial conception of social justice based on the politics of
location and the right to difference within the revised situational contexts of
post-modernity.
Soja, supra note 23, at 96. Additionally, this approach may well help to resolve con-
flicts between people of color within shared space.
110. bell hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics 150 (1990).
111. Id.
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mentation" is no longer a political weakness but a potential
strength: the spatiality searched for but never effectively discovered
in modernist identity politics.' 12
Often when I speak of "spatial equality" or community enrichment, I
am told that I am being rhetorical and impractical. But if you judge
efforts by results, this postmodern dream is no more rhetorical, im-
practical, or crazy than the attempt to integrate inner-city poor with
the white suburbs, a strictly limiting firstspace move. While it should
still be pursued, integrationists should not assume a monopoly on re-
medial effectiveness or on definitions of "doing the right thing."
While I favor integration, generations are likely to die before it is a
significant occurrence. We simply cannot wait for it any longer.
B. Fighting the "Underclass" Label and Developing Social Capital
A good deal of debate about policy responses to the ghetto poor,
barrio poor, and neighborhood poverty itself is distorted because
these poor and their poverty are over-inclusively associated with the
image of the undeserving poor. These people are deemed to make up
the so-called underclass groups-the inner city, the persistently im-
poverished, the jobless, the uneducated, the criminal, the violent, and
welfare underclasses. 13 The designation of underclass is more than a
reference to poverty. It incorporates a societal judgment that these
poor violate mainstream rules or norms of behavior. These poor are
seen as living in a self-perpetuating culture of poverty that causes
them to be so alienated and damaged that even if there were improve-
ments in their economic condition and increased access to a viable
opportunity structure, they would be unable to take advantage of
these changes. The remedial focus is on changing their behavior and
values rather than changing their structured inequality. Thus, from
the far right-wing perspective, Patrick Buchanan expresses this view:
The real root causes of the crisis in the underclass are twofold.
First, the old character-forming, conscience-forming institutions-
family, church, and school-have collapsed under relentless secular
assault; second, as the internal constraints on behavior were lost
among the black poor, the external barriers-police, prosecutors,
and courts-were systematically undermined ....
What the black poor need more than anything today is a dose of
the truth. Slums are the products of the people who live there ....
The first step to progress, for any group, lies in the admission that
its failures are, by and large, its own fault, that success can come
only through its own efforts, that, while the well-intentioned out-
sider may help, he or she is no substitute for personal sacrifice.114
112. Soja, supra note 23, at 99.
113. See Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 46, at 1246-52.
114. Thomas Byrne Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, Race, Atlantic Monthly, May 1991, at
53, 80 (quoting Patrick Buchanan).
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Some would associate these comments with an extremist position, but
in less harsh terms a recent New York Times editorial follows suit.
After detailing black-white income inequalities, it states that they are
"more a problem of poor education, weak skills and the rise in single-
parent families than of race." ' Similarly, Stephen and Abigail
Thernstrom claim that "the serious inequality that remains is less a
function of white racism than of the racial gap in levels of educational
attainment, the structure of the black family, and the rise in black
crime."' 6
The underclass label is problematic in various ways. Labels are not
mere words. They carry judgmental and normative connotations that
can influence societal institutions and individuals to punish those who
are stigmatically labeled. Behavioral labels and terms may illuminate
certain behavior, but they may also hide the poverty that can cause
the behavior that society deems to be negative. According to Herbert
Gans, because "underclass" is a code word that implies that undeserv-
ing people are not or should not be in society, those who accept the
term in this way justify excluding the poor from the rest of society
without expressly admitting it." 7 Moreover, because the term under-
class is racialized, it is a convenient way for masking antiblack or anti-
Latino sentiments. As a racial code word, it "accommodates contem-
porary taboos against overt prejudice .... Such taboos sometimes
paper over-and even repress-racial antagonisms that people do not
want to express openly.""18
By contesting such labeling as "culture of poverty" and "underclass
behavior," Wilson points to the proper direction. He argues that "the
key conclusion from a public policy perspective is that programs cre-
ated to alleviate poverty, joblessness, and related forms of social dislo-
cation should place primary focus on changing the social and
economic situations, not the cultural traits, of the ghetto under-
class."' 19 I do not mean to suggest that there is no problematic behav-
ior or dysfunctional values operating within the dynamics of ghetto or
barrio life. In recognition of this, however, Wilson explains that many
manifestations of inner city social dislocations should be analyzed as
symptoms of racial-class inequality, not as cultural aberrations, and,
therefore, "changes in the economic and social situations of the ghetto
underclass will lead to changes in cultural norms and behavior
patterns.' 120
115. Editorial, Black-White Income Inequalities, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1998, at A18.
116. Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and White:
One Nation, Indivisible 534 (1997).
117. See Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor: The Underclass and Anti-
poverty Policy 59 (1995).
118. Id.
119. Wilson, supra note 15, at 138.
120. Id. at 159.
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C. Developing Social Capital of Support and Leverage
In discussing inner-city poverty, there is a perennial debate over
whether remedial emphasis should be place-based or people-based) 21
I believe that a combinational development of social capital relaxes
the tension between these options. According to Robert Lang and
Steven Homburg, "social capital" is a concept that generally refers to
"the stocks of social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw
upon in order to solve common problems."'12 There are two primary
dimensions to social capital. First, there is a social glue aspect that
refers to the degree to which people participate in group life. It re-
lates to the amount of trust or comfort one experiences when identify-
ing and participating in a social group." s The second aspect of social
capital is a social bridging function that establishes links between
groups. The bridges are important, because "they not only connect
groups to one another but also give members in any one group access
to the larger world outside their social circle through a chain of affilia-
tions."'124 Both the glue and bridge aspects must be developed among
the inner-city poor. In redressing their plight we must keep in mind
that both stability and mobility are important.'2
A full consideration of social capital is well beyond the scope of this
Article, but we are increasingly recognizing a connection between so-
cial capital and housing policy that is also relevant to undertaking ad-
vocacy projects on behalf of the racialized, inner-city poor. We should
pay closer attention to social capital theory and development. Robert
Putnam identifies four interrelated challenges that lie ahead for social
capital theorists: 26 (1) showing the usefulness of social capital in new
domains; (2) developing a better understanding of how social capital
works; (3) deepening our understanding of the varied forms of social
capital and the cultural contexts in which these forms are found; and
(4) understanding how social capital is created. 27
121. See Susan S. Fainstein & Ann Markusen, The Urban Policy Challenge: Inte-
grating Across Social and Economic Development Policy, in Race, Poverty, and
American Cities, supra note 93, at 142, 143-46.
122. Robert E. Lang & Stephen P. Homburg, What Is Social Capital and Why Is It
Important to Public Policy, 9 Housing Pol'y Debate 1, 4 (1998).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. As Lang and Homburg suggest:
Applying the concept of social capital to public policy moves us beyond
many artificial distinctions and demonstrates that both place-based and peo-
ple-based strategies are needed to improve the lives of the poor. Using the
concept to frame issues also helps us predict in which cases a people- or
place-based policy, or some combination, is likely to work best.
Id. at 13. Here, I think we need to search for opportunities to employ a tandem
approach.
126. See Robert D. Putnam, Social Capital: Its Importance to Housing and Com-
munity Development-Foreword, 9 Housing Pol'y Debate at v, v (1998).
127. See id. at v-vii.
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Drawing upon the work of Xavier de Souza Briggs, 128 we must ex-
plore the ways in which social capital can help the inner-city poor gain
upward mobility. Briggs, for example, has compared two groups' so-
cial support networks. Both groups consist of public housing tenants,
one group residing in a predominantly African-American community
and the other residing in a middle-income, racially-mixed suburb. His
study indicates that the type of neighborhood is less significant to the
mobility of poor youth than the social networks available to them. He
distinguishes between social-support social capital and leveraged-op-
portunity social capital. 129 The first refers to social capital that helps
one "get by or cope," while the latter refers to social capital that helps
one "'get ahead' or change one's opportunity set through access to job
information, say, or a recommendation for a scholarship or loan.' 130
This form is about "access to clout and influence.' 131 Mobility strate-
gies emphasize this form of social capital as a coincidental benefit to
integration. Changing-location strategies often neglect to appreciate
the social support left behind. That support may include being able to
get a ride from a friend or neighbor, to confide in someone, to get
helpful advice, or to obtain a small, emergency cash loan.' 32 As
Briggs points out, "[a]lthough people at all income levels need social
supports, coping capital is especially vital to the chronically poor, as it
routinely substitutes for things that money would otherwise buy.
Some of the most important supports we all rely on, though, are emo-
tional and not material.' '1 33
I think it is wrong to emphasize mobility without appreciating the
trade-offs between leveraging and coping social capital. As people
move out of the inner-city communities, policy makers and advocates
should not only look at the new access to opportunity, but should also
look for ways to compensate for the loss of social networks. We must
proceed simultaneously to develop both forms of social capital. 134
Perhaps, in this way, the tension between place-based remedies and
128. See Briggs, supra note 24, at 179-80.
129. See id. at 178 (citation omitted).
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. See id. (citation omitted).
133. Id.
134. James Rosenbaum and his colleagues suggest how the Gautreaux Moving to
Opportunity Program can be improved: There should be a supplement to the almost
non-existent public transportation system in the suburbs, perhaps helping the movers
to finance the purchase of a car. Additionally, both child care assistance and employ-
ment training are needed. See James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commis-
sion's Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education, and Social Integration for
Low-Income Blacks, in Race, Poverty, and American Cities, supra note 93, at 273,
301; see also Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and Segre-
gation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A
Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1351, 1377 (1995) (arguing that
"[mlobility programs should be not only replicated but improved" along lines sug-
gested by Rosenbaum).
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people-based remedies can be relaxed, and those within and from in-
ner-city communities can develop their potential as a whole people
with strong community ties as well as broader access to a viable op-
portunity structure.
CONCLUSION
In discussing the difficulties of anti-discrimination advocacy,
Kimberln Crenshaw argues for the creation of an advocacy orientation
that reflects a distinctly black political framework that "is informed by
the actual conditions of Black people."'1 35 In her view, as distin-
guished from the civil rights vision, "this new approach should not be
defined and thereby limited by the possibilities of dominant political
discourse, but should maintain a distinctly progressive outlook that
focuses on the needs of the African-American community."'136 This
identifies a similar task at hand for representing those inner-city client
communities who live within the intersectional constraints of race,
space, and poverty.
Advocacy on behalf of these people and their places must be ac-
tivist, bold, innovative, and radically progressive. It must also be site-
specific and targeted in responding to the needs and aspirations of the
inner-city poor as a distinct social group. In this response, it must pro-
ceed in, literally, an organic manner. It must transgress boundaries,
including those that mark the professional role, socialization, and re-
sponsibility of attorneys. In representing inner-city poor people,
universalistic perspectives and orientations are likely to be ineffective.
In many cases, neither poor people nor their troubles can be viewed as
fungible. In responding to, and working with, our client communities,
we must identify which particular poor people and which particular
contexts are the subjects, before we can map advocacy strategies.
When race and space are synergistically involved with poverty, race-
neutral or color-blind poverty practice is naively wrong-headed. It re-
flects an approach that is both ahistorical and de-contextual. It badly
underestimates the interlocking elements of oppression. In terms of
redress sought, it stops us too far short. However good we may be at
our craft, we may be too divorced from the client community in per-
spective, relations, and sensitivity. Lawyers, especially non-minority
lawyers, may feel uncomfortable reading race into the story.
To all advocates, I wonder whether we can really "do good" without
respecting the client community's voice, vision, and humanity. I know
we pay lip service to issuing that respect, but nonetheless I wonder if
our practice genuinely reflects it. It is our professional responsibility
to do so. In responding to the actual conditions of the racialized, in-
ner-city poor, we must direct our quest for the cause of social justice
135. Crenshaw, supra note 32, at 1387.
136. Id.
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with respectful regard and comprehensive understanding of a world
that is foreign to us, even as we practice within it. Practicing law in
the community is not a tourist adventure and, therefore, we must es-
chew the routine of the autonomous, interloping advocate who
dreams up cases in the home office and then tests them on the com-
munity. That is, we must search for invitation, opportunity, and con-
nection that legitimate our very presence and committed practice. An
open mind and a correct sensibility may be more important than the
command of technical craft, because often we must learn as we go.
We must approach that learning in non-linear, non-laboratory ways.
Learning within our client communities will likely respond to these
places as "eco-system[s] of knowledge' 37 where learning is "multi-
dimensional, often messy and confusing."' 38 Only through this ap-
proach will advocates effectively become incorporated within the cli-
ent community.
We must then escape the debilitating and reactionary features of
"regnant" lawyering and adopt a progressively activist, yet patiently
open, collaboration with the client community. This approach must
not only reinforce the client community's coping energies of survival
and its habits of resistance to the oppressive opportunity-denying cir-
cumstances of racial-spatial inequality and economic subjugation, but
it must also accommodate our entry into the thirdspace, counter-hege-
monic world of these communities. However strange it may seem
there, we must respond as if it were at least tentatively familiar. We
must come with a faith in the ability of those in these communities to
hold fast to their struggles and their potential to, with support, trans-
form life within these communities. Through collaborative support,
we must have faith that our client base can reconstitute its communi-
ties as viable homeplaces. At the same time, we must recognize that
empowerment must extend beyond support and agency from the com-
munities within. It must go further and enable the clients to position
themselves to reach out and to assume a greater entry into a more just
and open society where opportunity can be leveraged in new and dif-
ferent ways.
Most of what I am articulating here is captured in bell hooks's ob-
servation that "[w]e are transformed, individually, collectively, as we
make radical creative space which affirms and sustains our subjectiv-
ity, which gives us a new location [(I would say 'place')] from which to
articulate our sense of the world."' 39 From within the space of mar-
ginality we can come to know a situatedness that is, in part, self-cho-
sen rather than oppressively imposed by external structures. This
137. Ernest A. Lynton, Knowledge and Scholarship, in Metropolitan Universities:
An Emerging Model in American Higher Education 87, 89 (Daniel M. Johnson &
David A. Bell eds., 1995).
138. Id.
139. hooks, supra note 110, at 153.
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marginalization does not write off people, but provides a vantage
point from which to see and act differently. From that vantage point,
one knows different things and one knows in different ways. This per-
spective and knowledge can propel resistance and construct radical
senses of openness and possibility. As bell hooks implores us: "Enter
that space. Let us meet there.' 140
140. Id. at 152.
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